E-Commerce

Strategies for Building Marketplaces

October 30th, 2012

This is a follow-up to my last post on the prevailing trends in e-commerce, I touched on marketplace e-commerce business models only briefly because it is a complex topic that require its own post.

We, at MuckerLab, love businesses not possible before the “invention” of a particular medium or platform – not only because (superficially) it’s a green field opportunity but also because these businesses are unencumbered by legacy constraints that had previously been hardwired into companies and industries these startups are trying to disrupt.  “Online marketplace” is one example –   an entirely new business model not possible (at scale) before the internet.  For a while during the first dot-com era, marketplaces were all the rage – with eBay leading the charge and dominating B2C – venture capitalists and entrepreneurs stamped out B2B marketplaces in every single vertical possible. By the end of the dot-com era, 99% of the b2b marketplaces cratered and eBay was left standing and thriving.  The prevailing consensus was that B2B marketplaces were too hard (e.g. workflow, not liquidity driven) and that B2C marketplaces cannot be built under the giant momentum of eBay’s “network effect.”  Investment stopped and entrepreneurs focused on other categories.  Turns out, network effects can be broken (e.g. Amazon and StubHub taking on eBay in mid 2000’s and the multiple second hand fashion marketplace startups today) and that there are tons of untapped verticals (e.g. Airbnb, oDesk). Plus if we just rebrand marketplaces, “collaborative consumption”, VC’s will open up their wallets (j/k).

As e-commerce becomes an investment thesis again, there are still a significant portion of VC’s that will not invest in traditional e-tail driven business models. They believe e-tail does not benefit from increasing return to scale or barrier to entry because of the lack of network effects. As a result, in many e-commerce verticals, the only way to get venture funding is to build a marketplace rather than build a e-commerce store front. (In most services driven verticals, marketplace is probably the only path possible.) However, one of the major problems for many “network effects” driven businesses is the “empty chat room” conundrum. Like a chemical reaction, a certain amount of activation energy (in marketplace talk, liquidity) needs to exist in the value network in order for the virtuous adoption cycle to take place. How do you achieve that critical mass of users needed in order to attract more users and eventually create barriers to entry to dominate your market? There are several strategies employed by marketplaces – most are not mutually exclusive.

  1. Start with aggregating scarce and in-demand inventory.In markets where demand outstrip supply – collectibles, antiques, vintage luxury products – the two sided marketplace problem can usually be solved by focusing on the supply side part of the business first.  Typically, demand and buyers can be found after supply liquidity has been achieved through a combination of word of mouth and SEO. eBay did a great job by building its initial marketplace around the collectibles category before expanding further. (see next point)
  2. Build “localized” network value.  It is critical for marketplaces to focus on creating critical mass in one specific segment of the customer base via marketing and sales. Users place different network value on having different type of users in the same marketplace based on their own preferences. Find a segment of the target market that values each other disproportionately higher than any other segments and concentrate on building critical mass in that segment before moving on to the next. (Really an extension of Crossing the Chasm for network effects businesses.)  Again, take eBay as an example, the Beanie Babies crazy in the mid to late nineties essentially jump started eBay.
  3. Siphon off demand and/or supply from another destination.  For a long time, this strategy remained the playbook of the paypal mafia (paypal used a variation of this strategy to build itself within and under the nose of eBay). More recently, given the preponderance of startups trying to do the same to/on Craigslist – starting with Airbnb, the question is no longer “if” but “where” to go to siphon off demand or supply. In reverse, the smart companies with critical mass of users have realized that “traffic” (which begets supply and demand) is the ultimate currency on the Internet thus they can become platforms by enabling structured methods (often as APIs) to allow smaller startups to syphon off inventory or users in exchange for revenue, ad inventory, branding or even more traffic. (Google, Facebook, eBay etc). More recently Pinterest, Intagram has also become destinations where startups are hacking for users, traffic, inventory and demand.
  4. Leverage influencers for liquidity. One of the most important trends in how traffic is distributed on the Internet is that individual are increasingly able to manipulate and control how their personal network value is directed versus the platform in which she built her network. (twitter vs. twitter users). The outcome for startups building marketplaces is that even in closed platforms, they can recruit influencers who already have built a sizable personal network effect to help sell, purchase, market, and source inventory for their destination.
  5. Create “point” product value. This strategy is probably the least understood and under-utilized in consumer driven marketplaces. In essence the strategy is to design marketplaces that have 2 components to its value proposition – point and network value. The point value is value proposition for the product independent of the # of people in the network. Point value is SAAS-like in nature – it allow users be more efficient, more accurate, and more productive.  As a result, users are compelled to adopt the solution regardless of marketplace liquidity. The harder part is to create coherent synergies between the two components that encourage the usage of the network component once the user begins using the point value feature set.
  6. Support series of one-to-many relationships. Using a related tactic to 4 and 5, one way to build marketplaces is to not treat the initial objective as building a marketplace but as enabling a series of connected but individual store fronts.  Start by allowing a single major buyer (more prevalent in B2B use cases) to more efficiently purchase from its existing supplier base, or in reverse (more common in B2C) enable a single seller to sell to its existing or new customers. The latter case, which is more applicable to e-commerce, the objective is to have a seller treat the personalized store as his or her own online presence and actively market it in existing marketing channels (social media, business directories, brochures, TV etc). This strategy is especially effective in taking offline merchants online as they lack sophisticated technology capabilities and will view the solution as an e-tail platform first and foremost and as a marketplace second. Furthermore, offline merchants already have captive customer bases to bring online – thus increasing marketplace velocity. Once multiple one-to-many networks are stood up, incremental tweaks to the inventory discovery experience can quickly turn the site into a full blown marketplace.
  7. Backfill with non-transactional listing to augment liquidity.  In most marketplaces, demand is non-persistent and perishable, i.e. most people do not need to buy 20 of the same beanie baby continuously for the next 3 month. As a result, demand needs to be continuously generated. Supply, however, is a different animal. Some supply is perishable such as one-of-a kind collectible baseball card, once someone buys the card; it is no longer available for sale.  Some supply is more persistent than others, such as plumbing services or commodity goods. Holding everything else constant, it is much easier to create liquidity in marketplaces where supply is persistent. Airbnb actually enjoys this phenomenon where it only has to acquire the “seller” once and his or her room or house will be available for rent on Airbnb for a persistent period of time (when it’s not rented out). In these categories, non-transactional (online or offline) directory or classified aggregators often exist such as Yellowpages for plumbers or Craigslist for temporary room for rent. It is often possible to backfill a marketplace with non-transactional listings to give buyers some limited value while the true liquidity is still being built.
  8. Time Shift Demand and Supply. Many of the current mobile focused marketplaces do a good job in time shifting demand or supply so that they can artificially be matched. Based on preferences or expressed user behaviors, these apps would send sms or app notifications when either a product becomes available for sell or conduct flash auction events for particular product category to pull supply and demand closer together.   Back in the days, we used to use a technique called “manually making a market,” i.e. like good commodity trader, we take a “buy order” and we shop it proactively across the market even if there isn’t a matching “sell order” to find latent demand or supply. In the early days of a marketplace, don’t rely on the user to “find it” on your marketplace – use any channel or  means possible to generate liquidity – if that means picking up the phone – so be it.

The probability of success for a new venture is by definition very low. Entrepreneurs looking to launch marketplaces must understand that the probability of success for marketplaces is not just linearly harder than traditional e-tail models but magnitudes harder.  On the other hand, once having achieved liquidity, marketplaces have significant advantages to simple e-tail businesses: merchandizing is organic, supplies self-adjusts to demand, growth rates are typically exponential, barrier to entry are much higher, and of course margins are 3X-4X higher as well.  There is always a leap of faith and an element of luck when it comes to building successful marketplace businesses.  By methodically stitching together a set of strategies and tactics to build liquidity, it is possible to reduce that element of luck and increase the probability of success.  In the end, success is not entirely impossible or uncontrollable. Especially given the outsized returns for winners, entrepreneurs looking to build billion dollar companies, must seriously consider attacking a market opportunity with the marketplace business model despite all the initial hurdles.

 

New Rules for E-Commerce

August 24th, 2012

(This post is published  @ Forbes.com I am just excerpting the first couple paragraphs on the blog)

It has taken a long time for the dust to settle from the battle for first generation e-commerce supremacy (Amazon.com and select smart brick and mortar guys won).  Fifteen years later, a confluence of macro trends on and off the Web have created a tidal wave finally strong enough to birth a whole new generation of new e-commerce companies.  Comparatively, in the same 15 years, the online photo market went through almost 4 generations of battles won and lost: Photobucket -> Flickr -> Facebook (->?) Instagram.

It took so long in e-commerce for several reasons:

  • It took many years for offline retailers to bifurcate between those who embraced Web technologies and thrived and those who failed at doing so – thus opening up new verticals for disruption.
  • New paid and social customer acquisition channels – Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, celebrity endorsements.
  • Amazon’s gigantic foot print has finally matured and slowed (transformation into a marketplace, SKU focused, free/fast shipping.)
  • Skills sets that used to exist in very different fields but necessary to win in retail and e-tail has finally converged into the same “entrepreneur,” including online acquisition, merchandizing, user interface and supply chain management.

Continue Reading @ Forbes.com

Mobile, The Great Destroyer of Companies

June 15th, 2012

Mobile is broken. Mobile commerce is broken. Mobile advertising is broken. Mobile lead gen is broken. Mobile app discovery is broken. Mobile app pricing is broken. Mobile subscription is broken.

There is no doubt that mobile is going to be more than 50% of internet usage within the next 18 month. The problem is that consumer adoption has gotten way ahead of the industry’s ability to innovate and capture value . . . and the worst part is that the gap continues to grow. I’ve bitched about this problem a while back but I never expected the problem to get worse. Seems like not a day goes by that a web giant gets their market cap cut off at the knees because of the shift of their userbase to mobile (Google, Facebook, Zynga, Pandora etc). Let me count the ways. . .

Mobile commerce has largely been a mirage. Only the very few and the very large e-commerce companies has been able to actually make their mobile users “buy” on a mobile device. This is because despite of Apple’s protests, mobile has largely been a content consumption device – the very act of getting users to input credit card number and data to buy something has become a near impossible task. (try typing 16 consecutive numbers on the iphone without out screwing up – especially when predictive auto-correct is useless.) Only the very largest sites can leverage their existing user base (from online) to get them to login (a comparably easier task) and use existing credit card information they’ve stored to skip the credit card step. As a result, the long tail of mobile commerce has yet to appear – small e-tailers are not moving to mobile, and innovation around mobile commerce has slowed to a crawl. (side note, where is Apple & Paypal when you need them?)

Mobile advertising is also broken because neither direct response advertising nor branded advertising have truly scaled. When the internet world collapsed in 2001, the internet economy got back on its feet because; as it turns out, the web is a great place to advertise when you have something to sell. It all started with GoTo and scaled with Google. Despite the economic down turn, e-commerce companies and lead gen companies went head long into search and even display advertising to help create a “pricing” floor for most web based advertising inventory. Mobile, because of the difficulties of entering contact information and credit card information, simply haven’t attracted a significant number of direct response advertisers that are looking for direct ROI on their advertising spend. Because of the lack of a pricing floor, most remnant and network driven mobile inventory CPM’s has cratered in the last 18 month (plus the explosion of mobile usage also created a glut of inventory.)

On the top end of the advertising market where brand advertisers spend their $15 to $35 CPM’s, mobile is struggling as well. The original thesis around brand advertising was around addressability, engagement, and targeting. Turns out, brand advertisers want non-standard ad creatives and integrated marketing campaigns on mobile, just like that did online (hmm… should have guessed that one) – the addressability stuff is cool but not as interesting as whole screen take over, exploding, dripping, spinning ad units. The problem is that mobile screens are so small that it is really really hard to create the type of branded campaigns that advertisers (and users) love.  With Apple taking away UDID – the addressability / targeting value proposition is eroding as well. And thus the premium mobile inventory pricing continue to drop.

Everyone had thought that local mobile advertising would be the great savior of mobile advertising too. The thesis around geo and context based targeting has lot of promise. But to-date, no one had figured out the tactical portion of how to effectively sell to local advertisers and get the advertiser coverage and inventory density needed to actually run a campaign.

If you cannot make money by selling advertising space on your mobile app or website, maybe, just maybe you can sell your app on either one time or subscription basis? Well, the mobile app economy is pretty dysfunctional too. It’s pretty common for a developer/publisher to charge $30+ for a desktop application or game (go visit Fry’s or Gamestop) – but in the android and apple app store, if anyone tries to charge anything above $5, people screams highway robbery. The lack of true breakthrough revenue opportunity for developing mobile apps has given publisher very little incentive to advertise and build “franchises” that can charge a premium price . . . it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even worse, Apple’s insistence on taking a huge cut of both onetime as well as recurring revenue from publishers effectively created a new virtual socialist state where 30% sales tax is levied on all transactions. Talk about killing innovation and jobs. . .

Now, here is the good news . . . the best and bravest entrepreneurs and VC’s look at structural problems in an industry as opportunities to innovate and exploit. Mobile is only in the 1st inning of reaching its full monetization potential. The first generation of mobile entrepreneurs focused on building companies that played within the rules inherited from the online world. The second generation mobile entrepreneurs will create new rules and platforms indigenous to the mobile world. A mobile ad network that converts. A new kind of mobile only ad unit. A distributed mobile commerce payment network. An alternative application discovery platform. An truly open mobile operating system. Fixing broken platforms = big ass opportunities.

 

Waiting for Social Commerce

December 19th, 2011

Since the founding of Facebook and Twitter; pundits, VC’s and entrepreneurs have been predicting the second tidal wave innovation to transform the e-commerce business as we had known it. “Social Commerce” was supposed to be the biggest thing since Jeff Bezos turned the web from a replacement for brochures & collaterals into a virtual store front. Six years later, after some fits and starts, and even a few success stories, the reality has not come close to matching the promise once made by all of us. We had imagined a world where social platforms like Facebook would institutionalize word of mouth into a channel so frictionless that infinitely viral (and free!) acquisition machines could be created for every business under the sun that would render search irrelevant or atleast supplementary. That world is not here yet, and perhaps way too ambitious in the first place, but I believe we are only in the first few inning of the game and the potential is still there. For now, we are still chasing, failing, iterating, and . . . waiting.

There is no doubt that social has completely disrupted the content & media business (news, blogs, photos, videos, music etc) – that for increasingly more of these companies, social platforms like Facebook and Twitter has become a larger source of traffic than search. But for e-commerce, it just simply hasn’t been true. Look at round the web today – 99% of e-commerce sites looked pretty much the same as it had tens years ago. Google remains the largest expense line for 99% of e-commerce companies. Some of the most successful companies associated with “social commerce” are not social at all. There is no “Group” in Groupon or “Social” in Living Social for that matter – if there was, they would not need to spend a gazillion dollars on Google every quarter. Most flash sales sites are the same. Outside of incentivizing customer with discounts for referrals; most haven’t been able to create much incremental virality on top of social platforms either. This is not to say that these companies are not game changing; they are, just not game changing in the social marketing context.

There is; however, a bright spot in the social commerce movement – in women’s fashion – an already deeply social (in the offline sense) category. The newest wave of subscription commerce businesses in fashion (ShoeDazzle, BeachMint) and others in more traditional e-commerce (ModCloth) has come close to cracking the nut on social commerce. Polling, incentivized sharing, loyalty rewards, crowd sourced designs, celebrity marketing etc – all work to varying degrees and would not have been possible without Facebook & Twitter. Unfortunately, many of these social marketing strategies are far better for retention than they are for viral acquisition. (Thus the dependence on Google continues.) Even more importantly, outside of women’s fashion, the playbook has yet proven to be effective marketing tactics. Whether the floodgate has finally been cracked opened or women’s fashion will remain an outlier to the rest of the e-commerce industry is still up in the air.

This is not to say that all non-fashion e-commerce businesses should give up on social marketing and advertising. Search will continue to get more expensive and new acquisition channels will need to be discovered for many e-commerce businesses to remain viable. Both Facebook and e-commerce companies will need to continue to experiment and invest in social commerce given the potential for disrupting the existing ecosystem (just look at the media business). Facebook needs to focus on creating new social mechanics and ad product specifically targeted at e-commerce companies – a good place to start would be to institutionalize & productize many of the techniques popularized in women’s fashion to make them more accessible and cheaper to experiment for everyone. (I wanted to add something about Twitter here, but they have to solve a horizontal monetization problem first). E-commerce companies on the other hand need to understand that the low hanging fruit (and the ROI) in social commerce will come from driving customer satisfaction, increasing customer lifetime value, building awareness, and improving brand positioning- not in acquisition. At the very least, treat the social platforms like email – a channel to engage with your existing customers. The utopian future where acquisition, activation, and retention mechanics of an e-commerce business are all built on top of social platforms like Facebook will come . . . but it is going to take longer than we had all expected.

(On the flip side, it also means there are still plenty of opportunities in social commerce for startups to exploit. Both in augmenting the Facebook platform as well as in creating new e-commerce businesses.)